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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1885 
___________ 
 
GLORIA J. WHITING, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LARRY A. BONAZZA, Individually and in his official capacity  
as a Police Officer of Smith Township; 
AMBER PRICE, Individually and in her official capacity  
as a Police Officer of Burgettstown Borough; 
SMITH TOWNSHIP, a Municipality; 
CHIEF BERNIE LARUE, Individually and in his official capacity  
as Chief Police Officer of Smith Township;  
BURGETTSTOWN BOROUGH, a Municipality; 
CHIEF GEORGE ROBERTS, Individually and in his official capacity  
as Chief Police Officer of Burgettstown Borough 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:09-cv-01113) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 11, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 16, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Gloria Whiting appeals pro se from the District Court’s entry of judgment in her 
civil rights case.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.   
I. 
 On the night of June 16, 2008, Whiting argued with a neighborhood teenager 
about the local playground curfew.  Whiting called 911 to report the incident, and Smith 
Township police officer Larry Bonazza was dispatched to the scene.  As Officer Bonazza 
arrived, the situation was escalating.  Whiting had moved from her house to an adjacent, 
unoccupied property where several of her neighbors had also gathered.  The neighbors 
were voicing their opposition to the playground curfew, and Whiting was yelling at the 
neighbors in kind.  In an attempt to quell the situation, Officer Bonazza instructed 
Whiting to return home.  Despite his instruction, Whiting remained outside, clamoring 
for the crowd of neighbors to leave what she claimed was her property.  Unable to diffuse 
the situation, Officer Bonazza radioed Burgettstown police officer Amber Price for 
backup and arrested Whiting for disorderly conduct.  Thereafter, Officer Price arrived at 
the scene and placed Whiting in handcuffs.  Officer Bonazza transported Whiting back to 
the police station.  Ultimately, Whiting was found not guilty of the charge of disorderly 
conduct.  
 In 2009, Whiting filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers 
Bonazza and Price, Smith Township, Burgettstown Borough, and the local magistrate 
judge who conduct Whiting’s video arraignment.  Whiting raised, inter alia, claims of 
false arrest and excessive force, alleging that Officers Bonazza and Price lacked probable 
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cause to arrest her for disorderly conduct and that the officers injured her during the 
arrest.  
 The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Whiting’s complaint 
but it offered Whiting leave to amend.  Subsequently, the District Court dismissed on 
immunity grounds Whiting’s claims against the magistrate judge.  (See D. Ct. Doc. 49 at 
21-23.)  In May 2011, Whiting amended her complaint for a second time, adding the 
police chiefs of Smith Township and Burgettstown as defendants.  The District Court 
dismissed the claims against the municipalities for failure to state a viable claim of 
municipal liability and as to the police chiefs on statute-of-limitations grounds.  (See D. 
Ct. Doc. 102 at 5, 12-13.)  Thereafter, Whiting and the two police officers filed cross 
motions for summary judgment.  The District Court entered summary judgment in favor 
of Officers Bonazza and Price and denied Whiting’s motion for summary judgment.  
Whiting timely appealed.                      
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Officers Bonazza and Price.  
See Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is 
proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, no genuine issue of material fact exists.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Saldana, 260 F.3d at 231.  We review de novo the District 
Court’s earlier orders dismissing Whiting’s claims against the magistrate judge, the 
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police chiefs, and the municipalities.  See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 
F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).           
 A.  False Arrest Claim 
 Whiting challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Officers Bonazza and Price on her false-arrest claim.  To prevail, Whiting needed to 
show that Officers Bonazza and Price lacked probable cause to arrest her for disorderly 
conduct.  See Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2008).  Probable 
cause to arrest exists when the information within the officer’s knowledge at the time of 
the arrest would be enough to allow a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that 
an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.  See United States 
v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990).  Under Pennsylvania law, a person is guilty 
of disorderly conduct if, inter alia, she “with intent to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . (1) engages in fighting or 
threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; [or] (2) makes unreasonable noise.” 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503.     
 Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Whiting, the record 
indicates that Officer Bonazza had reason to believe at the time that Whiting was at least 
recklessly creating a risk of public inconvenience by “engag[ing] in . . . tumultuous 
behavior” or “mak[ing] unreasonable noise.”  See id.  Officer Bonazza arrived on the 
scene shortly before 10:00 p.m. on a Monday night as Whiting was yelling at her 
neighbors who, in turn, were yelling about the playground curfew.  This behavior 
continued even after Officer Bonazza’s arrival on the scene.     
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 Whiting disputes the assertion that the events took place in “public.”  She claims 
that she owns the unoccupied adjacent property on which the argument took place and, as 
such, could not have committed disorderly conduct.  The defendants dispute her claim of 
ownership.  In any event, the answer to whether Whiting owns the vacant lot is not 
dispositive.  As the District Court noted, “public unruliness” is a sine qua non of 
disorderly conduct.  The statute defines “public” as “affecting or likely to affect persons 
in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places 
included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of 
business or amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises which are open to the 
public.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503(c).  Thus, even if some or all of the property 
belonged to Whiting, Officer Bonazza had reason to believe, as discussed above, that her 
conduct was affecting persons in a place to which the public has access, including her 
neighborhood and, specifically, the playground across the street from the vacant lot.
1
     
 And even if Whiting did have a false-arrest claim, Officer Bonazza would 
nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer in his position 
would not have understood that the arrest was unlawful.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
                                              
1
 In Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, we did indeed find that under 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503, a person cannot commit the offense of disorderly conduct 
inside her home.  But our decision in Groman is not controlling here.  Whiting was not 
inside her home; she was outside.  In Commw. v. Wertelet, we note, the Superior Court 
found no disorderly conduct where the plaintiff had been unruly on her own property, but 
it specifically noted that “she lives in a rural setting . . . [where] her actions could not 
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm . . .”  696 A.2d 206, 209 n.5 (Pa. Super. 
1997).  Whiting’s altercation, however, did not take place in a rural area.  It took place in 
the middle of her neighborhood and directly across the street from a public playground.  
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U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (entitlement to qualified immunity depends on whether (1) the 
plaintiff demonstrated the deprivation of a constitutional right; and (2) that right was 
established at the time of the alleged deprivation); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (noting that law enforcement “officials who act in ways they 
reasonably believe to be lawful” should not be held personally liable because “it is 
inevitable that [they] will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable 
cause is present”).  When Officer Bonazza arrived on the scene, he observed Whiting and 
the neighbors arguing in a vacant lot next to Whiting’s house and directly across the 
street from the playground.  He could not have been expected in the heat of the moment 
to ascertain the ownership of the vacant lot.  See Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“While probable cause to arrest requires more than mere suspicion, the 
law recognizes that probable cause determinations have to be made ‘on the spot’ under 
pressure and do ‘not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence [required at a 
trial].’”) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975)); see also Anderson, 483 
U.S. at 641.  Thus, as to the false-arrest claim, the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Officers Bonazza and Price was not error.
2
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 Summary judgment was appropriate as to Officer Price because the uncontested 
evidence demonstrates that Officer Bonazza told her that Whiting had caused a public 
disturbance.  This alone was sufficient for her to have believed probable cause existed.  
See Groman, 47 F.3d at 635 n.10 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 
(1979); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a police 
officer makes an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, [that] officer 
will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for unlawful 
arrest provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the 
statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed.”) 
7 
 
 B.  Excessive Force Claim  
 Whiting also challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to her 
excessive-force claim, alleging that Officers Bonazza and Price injured her when they 
placed her in handcuffs, forced her into the backseat of the police car, and drove 
recklessly to the police station.  However, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later 
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, is constitutionally unreasonable.”  
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 821 (3d Cir. 1997).  The degree of force that Officers 
Bonazza and Price used to arrest and transport Whiting had to exceed that which was 
reasonable.  Groman, 47 F.3d at 633-34 (3d Cir. 1995).  It did not.  
 The summary judgment record indicates that Whiting’s arrest was relatively 
routine.  Officer Price placed Whiting in handcuffs and, after a protracted period when 
Whiting pleaded to be seated in the front of the police car due to her anxiety and panic 
disorder, Officer Price pushed Whiting’s head down and placed her in the backseat.  See, 
e.g., Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2011) (no constitutional 
violation where officer forced unarmed, physically weak, elderly woman to the ground 
and held her there with a knee on her back for ten minutes because force was de minimis).  
Whiting has alleged that the handcuffs were too tight, that she suffered knee injuries from 
being placed in the backseat, and that she suffered a panic attack, but the record simply 
does not reflect that she made Officers Bonazza or Price aware that she was injured or in 
discomfort after being placed in the car.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Cnty. of L.A., 64 F.3d 
1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding excessive force where plaintiff repeatedly asked 
officer to loosen handcuffs and officer refused); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 
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(9th Cir. 1993) (denying qualified immunity to officer who tightly handcuffed an elderly 
man and refused to loosen the handcuffs).  Consequently, the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Officers Bonazza and Price.   
 C.  District Court’s Dismissal Orders 
 Finally, Whiting argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her claims 
against the municipalities, the police chiefs, and the magistrate judge.  Whiting claimed 
that the magistrate judge falsified documents and denied her request for her son’s 
assistance at a hearing.  In its February 10, 2011 order, the District Court dismissed these 
claims, finding the magistrate judge to be absolutely immune from § 1983 liability.  Of 
course, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his 
exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”  Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); see also Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 
760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).  And nothing in the record supports Whiting’s claim that the 
magistrate judge falsified documents.      
 For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, it also properly dismissed 
Whiting’s claims against the police chiefs, as the claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Whiting had to file her claims against them within two years from the time 
when she “knew or should have known of the injury upon which [the] action is based.”  
Sameric Corp. of Del. v. Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5524; Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).  The 
claims against the police chiefs accrued in June 2008, when Whiting was arrested for 
disorderly conduct.  But rather than naming the police chiefs as defendants in the original 
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complaint, she waited until filing her second amended complaint in May 2011—almost a 
year too late.
3
          
 To the extent that Whiting did not make out her claims of unlawful arrest and 
excessive force, her claims against the municipalities were necessarily deficient.  Whiting 
named Smith Township and Burgettstown Borough as defendants for the acts of its 
officers—Officers Bonazza and Price.  But municipal liability under § 1983 arises only 
when a constitutional deprivation results from an official custom or policy.  Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).  Here, as discussed above, Whiting 
suffered no constitutional injury.  See Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 
F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the 
hands of [any] individual police office, the fact that the departmental regulations might 
have authorized [unconstitutional action] is quite beside the point.”) (quoting City of Los 
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).  Therefore, the District Court properly 
dismissed Whiting’s claims against Smith Township and Burgettstown Borough.   
 For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
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 Nor did the claims relate back to the date of her original complaint.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c)(1).  Nothing in the record indicates that the police chiefs received notice 
within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint, or that they had imputed notice of 
Whiting’s law suit before December 21, 2009 (120 days after the complaint was filed).  
See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
notice may be imputed if the party to be added shares an attorney with the named party or 
the two share an identify of interest); see also Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 223 
(3d Cir. 2003) (under the “shared attorney” method of imputing notice, “the applicable 
test is not whether the new defendants will be represented by the same attorney, but rather 
whether the new defendants are being represented by the same attorney”). 
